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In a recent paper [S. Bagherinezhad and V. Karimipour, Phys. Rev. A 67, 044302 (2003)], a
quantum secret sharing protocol based on reusable GHZ states was proposed. However, in this
Comment, it is shown that this protocol is insecure if Eve employs a special strategy to attack.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65.Ud
In a recent paper [1], Bagherinezhad and Karim-
ipour proposed a quantum secret sharing protocol based
on reusable GHZ states. The security against both
intercept-resend strategy and entangle-ancilla strategy
was proved. However, here we will show that with the
help of her ancilla Eve can obtain half of the data bits
without being detected by the communication parties.
For convenience, we use the same notations as in Ref.
[1]. We will begin with the property of states |0〉12 and
|1〉12 under the Pauli operation σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
(i.e., flip-
ping). That is, it has the same effect to perform σx on
the qubit 1 or 2 in the Bell states |0〉12 and |1〉12, i.e.,
the state |0〉12 (|1〉12) will be converted into |1〉12 (|0〉12)
when a σx operation is performed on either of the two
qubits. This can be described by
σx1 ⊗ I2|0〉12 = I1 ⊗ σx2|0〉12 = |1〉12
σx1 ⊗ I2|1〉12 = I1 ⊗ σx2|1〉12 = |0〉12 (1)
where I denotes the identity operation. As a result, the
states |0〉12 and |1〉12 will be changed into each other un-
der odd times σx operation, and be left alone under even
times σx operation (including the operations on either
qubit). This property will be used later.
Now let us give an explicit description of Eve’s strategy.
In the beginning, Alice, Bob and Charlie share a GHZ
state |G〉 = (1/√2)(|000〉+|111〉) as carrier, and the data
bits Alice wants to distributed to Bob and Charlie can
be represented by q1, q2, q3, ..., qn. Eve prepares a qubit
in state |0〉 as her ancilla.
(i) In the first round, Eve intercepts the first sending
qubit (the one denoted by subscript 1) and performs a
CNOT operation C1e on this qubit and her ancilla after
Alice sent the particles, which produces the state
|Ψ0abce12〉 =
1√
2
(|000000〉+ |111111〉) (q1 = 0)
or |Ψ1abce12〉 =
1√
2
(|000111〉+ |111000〉) (q1 = 1) (2)
and then resends it to Bob. Here we use superscripts 0
and 1 to denote the states corresponding to q1 = 0 and
q1 = 1, respectively. This notation also applies to the
following equations and we will, for simplicity, suppress
the word “or” later.
It is obvious that these eavesdropping actions intro-
duce no error when Bob and Charlie disentangle the send-
ing qubits from the carrier. After that, the state of Alice,
Bob, Charlie and Eve can be specified by
|Θ0abce〉odd =
1√
2
(|0000〉+ |1111〉)
|Θ1abce〉odd =
1√
2
(|0001〉+ |1110〉) (3)
(ii) Eve performs a Hadamard gate on her ancilla. Ac-
cording to the protocol in Ref. [1], before entangle |q2〉
to the carrier, Alice, Bob and Charlie will do the same
actions on their respective qubits. As a result, the en-
tangled state will be converted into
|Θ0abce〉even = H⊗4|Θ0abce〉odd =
1
2
√
2
(|0000〉+ |0011〉
+|0101〉+ |0110〉+ |1001〉+ |1010〉+ |1100〉+ |1111〉)
|Θ1abce〉even = H⊗4|Θ1abce〉odd =
1
2
√
2
(|0000〉 − |0011〉
−|0101〉+ |0110〉 − |1001〉+ |1010〉+ |1100〉 − |1111〉)(4)
(iii) In the second round, Eve intercepts the first send-
ing qubit and performs a CNOT operation Ce1 on this
qubit and her ancilla after Alice sent the particles, and
then resends it to Bob. By these actions, Eve’s aim is to
avoid being detected by the communication parties.
After Bob and Charlie disentangled the sending qubits
from the carrier, according to the protocol in Ref. [1],
each of the four parties has made a CNOT operation on
their respective qubit (as the control qubit) and one of
the sending qubits (as the target qubit). Furthermore,
it can be seen from Eq. (4) that all the items in both
|Θ0abce〉even and |Θ1abce〉even have even weights. Therefore,
the effect of the above four CNOT operations is equiva-
lent to flipping either qubit in the transmitted state |q〉
even times. With the help of the property of |q〉 intro-
duced in above paragraphs, we can draw a conclusion
2that Eve’s actions introduce no error in this round and
the state |Θ0abce〉even or |Θ1abce〉even is not changed. Hence
Eve will avoid the detection of the communication par-
ties, though she can not obtain any information about
the data bit transmitted in this round.
(iv) As Alice, Bob and Charlie will do, Eve also
performs a Hadamard gate on her ancilla. These
four Hadamard operations change the entangled state
|Θ0abce〉even (|Θ1abce〉even) into |Θ0abce〉odd (|Θ1abce〉odd) as
described in Eq. (3), which will be used as a carrier in
the next round.
(v) In the third round, Eve can obtain partial infor-
mation about the data bit without being detected by
performing operation Ce1, making a measurement on the
first sending qubit and performing Ce1 again.
The particular process is as follows. Suppose the clas-
sical bit to be transmitted (that is, q3) is encoded as
|q, q〉 (q = 0 or 1). When Alice has entangled the sending
qubits to the carrier, the state of whole system can be
described by
|Φ0abce12〉 =
1√
2
(|0000, q, q〉+ |1111, q+ 1, q + 1〉)
|Φ1abce12〉 =
1√
2
(|0001, q, q〉+ |1110, q+ 1, q + 1〉) (5)
where the addition is performed modulo 2.
After the two particles were sent out by Alice, Eve
intercepts the first qubit and performs a CNOT operation
Ce1, producing the state
|Ω0abce21〉 =
1√
2
(|0000, q〉+ |1111, q+ 1〉)abce2|q〉1
|Ω1abce21〉 =
1√
2
(|0001, q〉+ |1110, q+ 1〉)abce2|q + 1〉1 (6)
where we have suppressed the ⊗ symbol. It can be seen
from Eq. (6) that the qubit 1 has been disentangled from
the entangled state. Eve then makes a measurement on
this qubit in Bz = {|0〉, |1〉} basis and gets the result
q (when q1 = 0) or q + 1 (when q1 = 1). Let ri (i =
1, 2, ..., n) denote the eavesdropping results on data bits
qi. Eve knows that r3 = q3 (when q1 = 0) or r3 = q3 + 1
(when q1 = 1). Afterwards, Eve performs Ce1 again to
recover the state as in Eq. (5), and then resends this
particle to Bob.
It can be easily verified that Eve’s actions introduce
no error when Bob and Charlie disentangle the sending
particles from the carrier. Besides, the carrier and Eve’s
ancilla is still in the state |Θ0abce〉odd or |Θ1abce〉odd as in
Eq. (3).
(vi) Eve uses similar operations to eavesdrop in the
following rounds. That is, she takes the same actions as
in step.(v) in odd rounds and the actions as in step.(iii) in
even rounds. Furthermore, when Alice, Bob and Charlie
perform Hadamard gates on their respective qubits at
the end of every round, Eve does the same thing (as in
step.(ii) and step.(iv)).
Through above strategy, Eve can avoid the detection
of the three legal parties and even extract information
about the odd numbered data bits at the end of commu-
nication. We mean the measurement results r3, r5, r7,
..., r2m+1 (where m = 1, 2... and 2m+1 ≤ n). Thus Eve
can draw a conclusion that Alice’s odd numbered data
bits q1, q3, q5, ..., q2m+1 must be equal to 0, r3, r5, ...,
r2m+1 or 1, r3 + 1, r5 + 1, ..., r2m+1 + 1.
The above eavesdropping result seems not so beautiful
because there are still two possibilities. However, accord-
ing to the protocol in Ref. [1], the three legal parties have
to compare a subsequence of the data bits publicly to de-
tect eavesdropping, which will leak useful information to
Eve. More specifically, as long as any odd numbered
data bit is announced, Eve can determine which of the
two possible results is true. By this means Eve can ob-
tain the odd numbered data bits completely except for
the little-probability event that all the compared bits are
even numbered.
It should be pointed out that the QKD protocol in
Ref. [2], which inspires the work of Bagherinezhad and
Karimipour [1], has the same hidden troubles, where Eve
can use similar strategy to extract partial information
about the distributed key. From this kind of attack we
can draw two instructive conclusions. Firstly, when we
employ the maximally entangled states as carriers like
the protocols in [1, 2], it can not effectively prevent a po-
tential eavesdropping to perform a Hadamard gate [1] or
a pi/4 rotation [2] on each qubit in the carriers. Secondly,
scheme designers should ensure that the announcement
of subsequence, i.e., the means by which the users detect
eavesdropping, would leak no useful information to the
eavesdropper.
In conclusion, we have presented a eavesdropping strat-
egy which allows Eve to obtain half of the data bits
without being detected by the communication parties in
Bagherinezhad-Karimipour protocol. Consequently this
protocol is insecure against this type of attack.
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